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Introduction
Perhaps no region other than the Near East plays a more important role in the
shaping of both the foreign and domestic policies of the United States. The 9/11 terrorist
attacks and subsequent deployment of hundreds of thousands of US soldiers to
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the massive budgetary burden placed upon the United
States government (and, by extension, its citizens) as a result of the War on Terror, lay
heavily upon the consciousness of the media and the concerns of the American people.
Much recent focus has also been placed on the impact that the need for secure petroleum
sources has had in guiding the ways in which the United States determines economic and
diplomatic policy toward the region, specifically Saudi Arabia and Iraq, as well as how
that concern has molded the United States’ domestic energy and environmental policies.
Historically, the dealings of the United States with the Near East have been strenuous to
all parties. While the United States has managed to work toward positive relations with
some nations, there remains an apparently fundamental barricade to long-standing,
peaceful, and prosperous relations with the many diverse nations in what is traditionally
known as the Arab Middle East.
The disparate dominant ideologies of the United States and its Arab counterparts
play a significant role in the difficulties that have plagued these relationships. Without
question, the support of the United States for the state of Israel is a contentious issue
which is not likely to be resolved, as far as the Arab world as a whole is concerned,
anytime soon or without torturous difficulty. US support for “liberal institutionalism” and
economic and social globalization is largely at odds with the spirit of Arab Nationalism
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and staunch independence which has dominated the socio-political landscape of many
Arab states in the Near East for the last many decades. At the same time, and perhaps
paradoxically, the core American values of individuality, personal success, social liberty,
and secularism do not mesh particularly well with the views of some Arab states which
hold in high esteem the value of religious devotion and its integration within the
governmental structure; nor are they congruent with the apparent tendencies toward
social cohesion and group beneficence prevalent among a number of these nations.
A number of basic and perhaps insurmountable differences line the road to
sustainable relationships between the United States and many of those states in the Near
East with which it currently has tenuous or troublesome relations. The above (very brief)
account does not even begin to take into consideration the numerous historical and
pragmatic realities which present additional challenges. The key negative consequences
resultant from the current state of affairs between the United States and Near East,
however, comes not from our enemies (imagined, potential, or very real), but rather our
single largest Arab ally within the region: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The purpose of
this essay will be to elucidate the nature of the relationship between the United States and
Saudi Arabia. I will give an historical account of relations between the US and its Saudi
allies, largely focusing on the numerous disagreements and difficulties which have arisen
between the two partners. I will then assess the character and extent of the current United
States relationship with the Kingdom using facts and figures from independent and
governmental organizations and committees, with particular attention to the bartering of
American weapons technology and military expertise for inexpensive Saudi petroleum. I
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will follow this with an analysis of the status of human rights and representative
government in Saudi Arabia, including attempts by domestic groups and individuals to
advocate for the establishment of formal rights and constitutional limitations on the
power of the Saudi Royal Family and Nejd religious authority. In concluding, I will offer
a qualitative judgment of the state of US-Saudi relations, followed by some steps that
might serve to improve or otherwise alter that relationship.

Our Troubled Past
Developing a sufficient understanding of the US-Saudi relationship is best
undertaken within the frame of the history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and that
between the two countries. The motivations that guide the actions of both states cannot be
ascertained without such analysis, given the seemingly unlikely and arguably untenable
nature of such a relationship. Why would a country committed to liberty, democracy, and
the non-entanglement of religion and government extend not only support, but promises
of defense, to a restrictive Kingdom in which power is wielded entirely by an unelected
hereditary monarch and fundamentalist religious order? Analysis shows that the original
reasoning behind the formation of the relationship—not only that of the Americans, but
also of their Saudi counterparts—is still largely intact. As the needs of each nation have
changed over time, new rationales for the relationship and its continuance have emerged.
It remains to be seen whether the new difficulties posed within a post-9/11 global
environment will be taken in the same strident manner as previous challenges.
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The beginnings of the Saudi Empire can be traced back to the 1700s and
Muhammad bin Saud, a follower of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, the figure behind
Wahabism—a formulation of Islam stressing strong belief in the fundamentality of the
Quran as understood by early Muslims, opposition to Muslims who practiced what
Wahabists considered polytheism, and a focus on theological and cultural individualism
in place of adherence to commonly accepted social norms. (Yergin 1991, 284) Together,
the Saudi family and Wahabis took control of the majority of the Arabian Peninsula
within a half century, until incurring the wrath of the Ottoman Empire in 1818 when
Wahabi expansion threatened the powerful Turks. Decades of work were undone swiftly
at the hands of the Ottomans, and Saudi-Wahabi dominance of the Arabian Peninsula was
checked, relegating the group to little more than a tribe. While the Saudi Kingdom was
shortly re-established in Riyadh, familial infighting doomed this restoration to failure.
One grandson of bin Saud, Abdul Rahman, acted as the governor of Riyadh, but strife
with the al-Rashid family forced him into exile in Kuwait along with his son, Abdul Aziz.
(Yergin 1991, 284)
While in Kuwait, Abdul Rahman attempted to popularize Wahabist Sunni Islam
and recreate the Saudi Dynasty. Meanwhile, his son was educated religiously and
politically, and given training in the ways of war by Mubarak Al-Sabah, the Emir of
Kuwait. During this lull in Saudi family control of the region, a time of relative stability
in what would soon become Saudi Arabia, American missionaries seized the opportunity
to spread their religious message and opened up rudimentary medical clinics to serve the
needs of tribes, marking the first known involvement of Americans in the area. These
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missionaries and others in surrounding territories would end up treating hundreds of
thousands of Saudis, playing a notable role in King ibn Saud’s eventual affinity for
Americans. As war broke out between the al-Rashid family and Kuwait, Abdul Aziz was
sent to Riyadh to retake the city for the Saudi family. Although his first attempt to sack
the city failed, he managed to sneak into the city during the night of January 15th, 1902,
succeeding in killing the Rashid governor on his second endeavor. (Yergin 1991, 284)
Several years of military victories established Abdul Aziz—now ibn Saud—as the de
facto ruler of central Arabia. At the same time, he procured a large, dedicated army after
ascending to the leadership of the Ikhwan religious movement. With the help of these
devoted fighters, ibn Saud took control of areas in the eastern Arabian Peninsula,
including some areas inhabited by Shi’a tribes, which were allowed to practice their
religion with relatively little intolerance or persecution due to ibn Saud’s understanding
of the political importance of religious acceptance of conquered peoples. Following these
victories in the East, ibn Saud added territories in the Northwest in the years after the
First World War, effectively securing Saudi dominance within the Arabian Peninsula.
The Arabian Peninsula at the dawn of the 1920s was completely unaffected by the
imperialism which had run rampant throughout the remainder of the Near East. As Great
Britain put down anti-imperialist revolts in Iraq and Egypt, the Syrian rebellion against
French control raged on, and the modern beginnings of torturous conflict were sparked by
the proxy-imperialism of the British which called for the creation of a Jewish homeland
in Palestine via the Balfour Declaration issued in 1917, the only significant source of
conflict within the peninsula was tribal warfare; its only noteworthy revenue-generating
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enterprise tourism by Muslim pilgrims completing the Hajj by traveling to Mecca and
Medina. British discontent with Saudi interference in Kuwait prompted the High
Commissioner of Britain to arbitrarily create borders between Kuwait and ibn Saud’s
territory, also establishing Saudi-Iraqi borders. (Yergin 1991, 285) Aside from this,
however, ibn Saud was left to his own devices within the region, allowing the leader’s
tribes and Wahabi supporters to capture the Muslim Holy Land of the Hejaz in 1923, a
region which had previously been controlled by the British-backed Hashemites. The new
King of the Hejaz was struck down with illness, however, and called upon the aid of
Louis Dame, an American missionary in Kuwait, for medical attention. Dame was able to
restore King ibn Saud to health in a week, leaving the King thoroughly indebted to his
new American friend.
At the same time, America began to eye the Near East with a thirst for oil,
sparked by “accelerated industrialization, the mass production of automobiles, and
electrification of households” which “had propelled the demand for petroleum in the
United States well beyond its production capacity.” (Oren 2007, 410) However, all
known potential sources of petroleum were cut off to American exploration: Iran’s oil
resources were split between Britain and the Soviets, while Palestine, Syria and Iraq were
the exclusive extraction zones of Britain and France per the imperialist 1916 Sykes-Picot
Agreement, legitimized by a mandate of the League of Nations. Eager to tap into these
vast oil resources, the seven largest US oil companies united with the assistance of the
Federal Government to negotiate their way into the rush for raw materials in the Near
East, working with Britain and France to create the Iraq Petroleum Company. Through
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this agreement, the United States would receive around 24% of all petroleum extracted
from within the IPC-controlled areas of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Palestine; in return, it would
not explore elsewhere within the region for additional oil.
The Red Line Agreement of 1928 arbitrarily established the Middle East—the
region open for exploration and exploitation by the IPC—as all of the aforementioned
areas, as well as Turkey and the entirety of the Arabian Peninsula. Still relatively green to
the power he yielded, King ibn Saud rightly feared the long arm of European
imperialism, which had wrought havoc upon his northerly neighbors, encroaching upon
his burgeoning Kingdom. Shortly after this international gerrymandering by the IPC, the
economic depression which had the world in a stranglehold began to be felt in Saudi
Arabia, as job losses and pay cuts within the Middle East took a toll on the Kingdom’s
largest source of economic production: travel to Mecca and Medina. Remembering
fondly the American missionaries who had assisted not only his people but himself, the
King believed that his best course of action would be to turn over to the United States
exclusive rights to mineral exploration as a means of addressing the economic downturn
within the Kingdom. Karl Twitchell, a friend of the famed American Anti-Zionist Charles
Crane, was chosen to lead this vast undertaking, though his efforts proved fruitless until
the discovery of oil on the island of Bahrain in the summer of 1932 by another group. In
early 1933 Twitchell would begin negotiations, along with the Standard Oil Company of
California (SOCOL), a non-member of the IPC, for exclusive exploration and extraction
concessions. King ibn Saud, desperate for the highest possible immediate payoff, opened
discussions with the IPC as well. “A bidding war ensued in which the two sides offered
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increasingly stratospheric sums, which the Saudis then coyly rejected. The Americans
ultimately triumphed, however, thanks to their willingness to pay in gold…” (Oren 2007,
413) In the end, the United States gave in exchange for exploration rights the total of
$15.5 million in today’s dollars, and millions more still in loans to come. (Oren 2007,
414)
This arrangement both solved Saudi Arabia’s significant economic woes and
jump-started what would become one of the single most important diplomatic
relationships for both the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for decades to
come. The payoff was not immediate for Americans, however: it was not until 1937 that
substantial oil resources were discovered, but by the end of that year Saudi oil production
was skyrocketing. The King, pleased with the discovery, offered to Americans the
opportunity to explore the rest of his land—for a price. Yet again, the King induced
another bidding war, which the Americans shortly won over Japan and Germany to the
tune of nearly one million dollars. In the late 1930s, challenges to American economic
dominance in Saudi Arabia arose once again, with Nazi Germany unsuccessfully offering
superior sums of money as a means to solicit access to vast Saudi oil fields. The State
Department nevertheless refused to make formal the relations of the United States with
Saudi Arabia, and turned down ibn Saud’s request for $10 million in Lend-Lease Aid,
need resultant from the Saudi economic downturn during World War II and the fear of
Axis attacks on the Kingdom due to its relationship with America. Despite the fact that
the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia was more significant and more
imperative than those with any other Arab state due both to its vast oil reserves and
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importance to the global Muslim community, the Roosevelt administration saw no
legitimate point in supplying aid to “a backward, corrupt and non-democratic society like
Saudi Arabia.” (Oren 2007, 418)
The American President would largely change his tune as the war lurched onward
and the need for oil became a pressing issue in an economy already completely mobilized
for the war effort. Attempts to lobby Iran for oil exploration were spurned by the relevant
parties (the English, the Soviets, and nationalist Iranians), leaving only Saudi Arabia to
quench the thirst of the colossal American war machine moving into the mid-1940s. With
the importance of oil skyrocketing, ARAMCO (the Arab American Oil Company,
formerly SOCOL) was given government permission to build new oil pipelines. The
United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia was fully legitimized when William Eddy
became the first Ambassador to the Kingdom of ibn Saud. On February 16th 1943,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt reversed his position, stated just four years earlier, that the
government of Saudi Arabia was both unfit and undeserving of Lend-Lease Aid. The
primary motivation for this reversal came on the advice of Undersecretary of the Navy
William Bullitt, who brought to the attention of FDR that Britain had designs on Saudi oil
resources. Believing Saudi Arabia unable to defend itself and fearing the potential loss of
an American monopoly on the peninsula, Roosevelt placed the full force of western
military technology behind the kingdom. “The defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the
defense of the United States,” Roosevelt publicly stated, signifying the increasing
strategic and economic importance of the ties between the two very different countries.
Roosevelt would further bolster his government’s relationship with that of ibn Saud
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almost exactly two years later in what would prove to be one of the most significant
episodes in the history of American diplomacy.
The 1945 meeting between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and King ibn Saud was
sparked by the increasing attention being paid to pro-Zionist movements in America,
most notably the public declaration of support for the state of Israel by both Republican
and Democratic parties. “Of all the American interests endangered by the Palestinian
dispute, none was more imperiled than oil and no Arab figure more incensed by
America’s Zionist drift than King ibn Saud…” (Oren 2007, 468) Roosevelt had
personally seen to the creation of the War Refugee Board, which aimed to plan for Jewish
repatriation to Palestine following World War II. As the establishment of the Jewish state
in Israel was gaining momentum and support from the West, the Royal Family and
Wahabi religious order outwardly expressed their dissatisfaction in a 1943 letter to
Roosevelt, warning of “harsh backlash against American interests throughout the Middle
East if, ‘God forbid…the Allies should, at the end of their struggle, crown their victory
by evicting the Arabs from their home.’” (Oren 2007, 469) The outrage of King ibnSaud, which Roosevelt believed could have significant trade repercussions (especially
pertinent given the mobilized nature of the United States in the mid-1940s), compelled
the American President to unprecedented measures of diplomacy in early 1945.
As the prelude to a tour-de-force of Near East politicking, Roosevelt met with
long-time King Farouk of Egypt to discuss tourism and cotton production, and
entertained the presence of immensely powerful Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, promising US
support for Ethiopian independence in the face of Fascist Italy’s plans for domination. On
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February 14th, King ibn-Saud and sixty of his closest men boarded the USS Quincy
docked in the Great Bitter Lake. Despite Roosevelt’s efforts to focus the discussion on
US support for modernization within Saudi Arabia and the Near East as a whole, King
ibn Saud was concerned singularly with the Palestinian issue. Despite the murder of
millions of Jews across Europe and the unimaginable suffering of many more, King ibn
Saud rejected outright any argument for repatriation to Israel. Saudi Arabia’s King was
committed to the position that if anyone should fit the bill of the Jewish refugee question,
it ought to be “the criminal, not the innocent bystander.” (Oren 2007, 471) What claim
did the millions of Jewish refugees have to a region they had not occupied in any
significant capacity in decades and which was now rightfully occupied by a substantial
Arab population? If anywhere, the Jewish population displaced by the Third Reich ought
to be awarded “the choicest German houses,” ibn Saud reasoned. (Oren 2007, 471)
Convinced that no progress could be made on the issue, Roosevelt abandoned his
attempts to argue for a Jewish state in Israel. Seemingly reversing his previously Zionist
position entirely, FDR assured King ibn Saud that the United States would not assist
Israel at the expense of the Arabs in Palestine, and reiterated his support for the defense
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, evinced by Saudi inclusion in America’s Lend-Lease
program two years prior. Beyond this, President Roosevelt promised the King that the
United States would ardently defend and encourage the freedom and independence of
other states within the Near East. Satisfied with the outcome of the discussions, King ibn
Saud would count Roosevelt (who died two months later) as a friend, and America as a
stauncher ally than ever before. Zionists the world over were outraged at the apparent
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kowtowing of Roosevelt to the interests of ibn Saud; Arabs rejoiced at what many viewed
as a key victory in the fight for Palestine. In retrospect, the eventful meeting between
Roosevelt and ibn Saud has been viewed as “a landmark in America’s ascent to Middle
Eastern hegemony” in which “the leader of the world’s most powerful democratic nation
had in fact bowed to the dictates of an Arabian chieftain.” (Oren 2007, 473)

Cold War, Close Ties
The end of World War II and beginning of the Cold War era would prove to be a
tumultuous era in the history of US-Saudi affairs. In 1945, Saudi Arabia agreed to allow
the United States to maintain an airbase in the eastern city of Dhahran. This base would
allow the United States to protect its economic interests in Saudi Arabia and was of great
geostrategic importance given the ease of access to the Near East. The presence of a
ready American military force was also of benefit to Saudi Arabia, a nation still fearing
imperialist aims. Rather than France or Britain, however, ibn Saud—and by extension the
United States—now had the Soviets to fear. The state of Israel in particular was viewed
by ibn Saud as “a bridgehead into the Near East of communist ideas and influence.”
(Lippman 2009, 213)
Saudi opposition to communism was not based solely on its (perceived or actual)
connection to Zionism, nor the threat it might pose to the Kingdom’s economic interests
within the region and around the world, but rather the challenge it posed to state
sovereignty and the decidedly godless nature of its ideology. “The Kingdom always
looked upon the principles and the ideas of communism as being anathema to human
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thought and well being. There was a total rejection of Marxist ideas by the Kingdom…”
(Bronson 2006, 136) In 1950, President Truman recognized the strategic and economic
importance of a Saudi state free from socialist doctrine, and bolstered defense of the
Kingdom, arguing that it was “important to the preservation of the peace and security of
the Near East area, and to the security of the United States.” (Lippman, 277)
The early 1960s presented the opportunity for the United States to put force
behind its statements when Nasser’s Egypt, angered at Saudi opposition to the Nassersupported republican coup in Yemen, threatened Saudi Arabia with military action, going
as far as to bomb a handful of Saudi cities and make weapon drops to areas potentially
supportive of the Nasserist cause. Prince Faisal (who at the time performed many duties
of the King in place of his irresponsible and untrustworthy brother, King Saud) believed
that Nasser “had one sole aim, namely, to crush the authority of the Saudi Arabian
Government.” (Bronson 2006, 85) Kennedy pushed Faisal toward domestic reform,
arguing that internal reform which would benefit Saudi citizens was the best method of
preventing the spread of Nasserism within the Kingdom. Kennedy believed he had
succeeded when Faisal produced the ten-point “Basic Law for the Government,” but the
institutional reforms it stipulated were largely without teeth and, aside from the abolition
of slavery, failed to have any significant impact on the lives of citizens. When Egypt’s
bombs hit Saudi soil in 1962, President Kennedy assured Faisal that he was working with
the United Nations to arrange for a ceasefire. However, Faisal doubted the president’s
commitment to the Saudi regime, discerning a pro-Nasser tilt in his negotiations, and
Kennedy approved the deployment of fighter jets to demonstrate US support for Saudi
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Arabia. In doing so, President Kennedy forfeited any possible leverage for reform within
the Kingdom. (Bronson 2006, 88) Much like FDR in his landmark meeting with King ibn
Saud, Kennedy collapsed on longstanding US aims, believing the relationship with Saudi
Arabia too important to the maintenance of US hegemony within the Near East to risk its
compromise.
As tensions increased between Egypt, Syria and Israel in 1966, Saudi Arabia
assisted Syria and Jordan in their anti-Nasser rhetoric, alleging that Egypt had left its
Arab brothers in Syria for dead by failing to provide defense against Israeli attacks on
Syrian territory. Tensions within the Arab world increased sharply, particularly over a
perceived lack of Egyptian support for Palestine. Meanwhile, Faisal was criticized for his
own lack of support for Palestine, prompting the King to mobilize Saudi forces in
southern Jordan as a show of solidarity. One day after the outbreak of the Six Day War,
Nasser made false accusations that the United States had provided support for Israel via
air cover, prompting Algeria, Kuwait and Iraq to end oil exports to the US and United
Kingdom. Saudi Arabia followed suit the next day, with riots and attacks on American oil
workers and diplomatic presences by citizens throughout the east of the Kingdom.
Though American and British diplomats denied the rumors fervently, their claims were
met with guarded skepticism at best and outright disbelief at worst. One British
correspondent’s experience sums up the status of the rumor within the Kingdom:
“President Abdel Nasser's allegation…is firmly believed by almost the
whole Arab population here who listen to the radio or read the press…
Our broadcast denials are little heard and just not believed… I consider
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that this allegation has seriously damaged our reputation in the Arab world
more than anything else and has caused a wave of suspicion or feeling
against us which will persist in some underlying form for the foreseeable
future…” (Podeh 2004)
The immediate cost of Nasser’s accusation—the 1967 Arab Oil Embargo by Iraq,
Syria, Kuwait, Algeria, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Libya, United Arab Republic and
Saudi Arabia—stands as the first major explicit use of petroleum resources as a political
bargaining chip by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Although the
affected countries were able to successfully circumvent the short-lived embargo via
alterations to trade agreements and the use of surplus domestic oil resources, OPEC
members now had a fully realized method of international political ransom. Petroleum
politics in particular are extremely effective due to the inelastic nature of oil to the major
economies of the world. With the onset of the Yom Kippur War in October of 1973,
history would repeat itself, and the oil-producing Arab states would use the power of the
petroleum embargo to its full extent.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the defeat of the united Arab forces at the
hands of the Israelis proved to be a landmark occurrence in the history of the region as a
whole. With Nasser and the other Arab Unionists overpowered, the spirit of Arab
Nationalism quickly declined. As a result, “power began migrating across the Red Sea
from Egypt to Saudi Arabia” as the spirit of religious fundamentalism gained ground
throughout the Arab world as an alternative to failed secular movements. (Bronson 2006,
103) With Cold War tensions still playing out in the Middle East, Washington would
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make use of this strong religious spirit as a means to counteract the ‘godlessness’ of
communism. Under Nixon, the aims of the United States in the Near East largely served
the purpose of deterring the spread of communism throughout the region. Nixon charted
an even handed course for the Near East, balancing prior staunch US support for Israel
with a more equitable approach to its Arab neighbors, but put the fight against
communism above all: “‘even handedness’ is the right policy—but above all our interest
is—what gives the Soviet[s] the most trouble—don’t let Arab-Israeli conflict obscure that
interest.” (Bronson 2006, 110)
As American interest in the Arab-Israeli peace process waned, unrest grew within
Palestine and amongst Palestinian refugees throughout the Near East. The early-70s
marked a lull in US-Near East affairs, with “virtually no Middle East Policy other than
supporting the status quo.” (Bronson 2006, 115) Meanwhile, Palestinian malcontents
within Saudi Arabia targeted bombs at the Saudi oil infrastructure, and Saudi Oil Minister
Shiekh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the architect of plans to relegate OPEC operations
increasingly into the public sector, warned that Saudi petroleum policy might require
substantial alterations if the United States did not push for Israeli withdrawal from the
territories occupied during the Yom Kippur war. As opposition to Saudi ties to the United
States mounted with continued benign American support for Israel, Faisal came to fear
that his base of support would be irreparably eroded by another outbreak of Arab-Israeli
fighting. The king’s threats of embargo were nonetheless dismissed by the American
foreign policy elite.
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On October 6th, 1973 Syria and Egypt—backed by the Soviets and with help from
Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan and Saudi Arabia—launched an
aggressive attack against US-supported Israel. The goal of the United States was not to
guarantee complete Israeli victory; in fact, Henry Kissinger sought the sort of outcome
which would maintain Israeli independence yet allow for an Arab-Israeli peace process,
and which would display to those Arab states potentially sympathetic to the Soviet cause
the unmatched benefits of partnership with the United States. Faisal was impressed with
the level of American support for the Israelis, remarking that “this is why we need to
maintain close relations with the U.S.” (Bronson 2006, 118) Despite the impressive
impact made by this demonstration of the United States’ ability to back its allies, Israel
was still the enemy of the Arabs in the eyes of the monarchy, and America’s deeds would
not go without punishment.
Gulf state delegates met in Kuwait a week after the outbreak of the 1973 war,
agreeing to a seventy percent increase in oil prices; the next day, a meeting was held
amongst Arab oil ministers to discuss punitive measures against supporters of Israel.
Yamani and the other representatives agreed to cut production by five percent for every
month that the United States and others supported Israel, with Saudi Arabia adding
another five percent reduction per month to those states supporting Israel. When
President Nixon agreed to re-supply Israel with $2.2 billion in weaponry, Faisal ordered a
full Saudi embargo. In order to gain compliance from ARAMCO, the king threatened
complete nationalization. The immediate affect of the embargo (and more importantly,
the production cuts) was a stranglehold on US military operations abroad. This, however,
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could have left Saudi Arabia vulnerable to Soviet attacks, thus forcing Faisal’s hand in
allowing secret oil shipments to American warships. “The Saudi leadership [again]
considered its geostrategic competition with the Soviets and its relationship with the
United States more important than the Arab-Israeli one…” (Bronson 2006, 120)
The 1973 war came to an end on October 25th, but the OPEC embargo held strong
so long as the United States made no commitment to an Arab-Israeli peace process. As
oil prices in the United States were up seventy percent over the course of the embargo,
Henry Kissinger’s famed Shuttle Diplomacy made gains via ceasefires between SyrianEgyptian forces and Israel. Progress with Saudi Arabia, however, was slow. Meanwhile,
the economies of Western Europe and the United States came to a screeching halt, with
consumer and industry alike crippled by inability to quench the need for oil. Growing
frustrated with the situation, Kissinger publicly declared that “if pressures continue
unreasonably and indefinitely…the U.S. will have to consider what countermeasures it
might have to take.” (Bronson 2006, 121) Yamani warned that any aggressive moves by
the United States would result in Arab sabotage of oil fields, and the Shah of Iran worked
toward a substantial price increase, now known as the Christmas Eve Massacre, which
resulted in a doubling of oil prices.
Two substantial price increases in a two month period, on top of the already
painful production cuts, left Western Europe and the United States in a perilous position
in relation to its Soviet antagonists. “Soviet leaders were reveling in the ‘crisis of
capitalism’ that the oil embargo was causing.” (Bronson 2006, 122) Again fearing the
geostrategic consequences of a weakened international anti-communist presence, King
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Faisal led the charge to ease the affect of the embargo on the United States by
substantially increasing production. Joined by the rest of OPEC, Saudi Arabia effectively
ended the damaging 1973 embargo, though its official end did not come until March of
the next year. As it had done early on in the embargo, Saudi Arabia served its own
international self-interest (and those of the United States) at the cost of its local
responsibilities to Palestine. Insomuch as Americans felt anger toward Saudi Arabia and
other OPEC members for months of debilitating economic hardship, many throughout the
Arab world regarded the Saudi monarchy as turncoats, serving the interest of the United
States to the detriment of the larger Arab cause.
Almost as though the 1973 embargo had never happened, US-Saudi affairs
quickly normalized. Taking in hundreds of millions of dollars per day, Saudi Arabia was
awash in petrodollars with quadrupled oil prices. The brand new Ford administration
made it a central foreign policy aim to draw Saudi investment, so as to prevent or
minimize Saudi funding of states with policies more in line with Arab interests (and often
counter to American goals). Furthermore, Kissinger reasoned that if Saudi Arabia had a
significant stake in the economic survival of the United States, it would be less willing to
use petroleum as a weapon against its own interests. At the same time, newfound Saudi
wealth was sure to attract unwanted international dangers, and it was to the benefit of the
Kingdom to seek even greater defense assistance.
An ambitious economic cooperation agreement with the United States was
undertaken by Prince Fahd, allowing Saudi Arabia’s five-year economic, technology,
defense and industry development plan to increase more than tenfold over the previous

20

five-year plan, totaling $480 million. Saudi Arabia agreed to an American weapons
purchase plan which saw its foreign military costs soar from $305 million to well over $5
billion in a two year period. With the Vietnam War coming to an end, the militaryindustrial complex needed fresh markets into which it could export its arms, and Saudi
Arabia eagerly gobbled up everything from advanced naval equipment to American
corporate military training for the Royal Family’s private National Guard. (For detailed
accounts of the extent and nature of the military-industrial complex, though not
particularly as it relates to Saudi Arabia, see Chalmers Johnson's The Sorrows of Empire
and Nick Turse's The Complex.) Increasingly, the Saudi and American economies were
becoming tightly fused, with Saudi economic and technological advancement coming at
unprecedented rates, much to the dismay of the largely traditional, conservative
population. This only worsened when, in March of 1975, King Faisal was assassinated by
his nephew for the 1965 murder of his brother at the hands of police during protests over
the introduction of television and radio. While King Khaled ascended to the Saudi throne,
Prince Fahd in fact fulfilled a larger political role, and was more acquiescent to American
wishes and increased modernization than the balanced Faisal. (Bronson 2006, 138)
The Saudi administration continued its support for Palestine, pro-Islamic causes,
and most importantly, the fight against regional communism, bolstered by its billions in
surplus capital and often independent of American efforts (though certainly with its
blessing). Post-Watergate distrust of the federal government left the Executive Branch
tied with the passing of the restrictive Clark Amendment, and Kissinger was forced to
achieve US foreign policy goals through alternative means. Through the recently
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undertaken economic sharing plan, which provided blanket funding free from significant
Congressional regulation, Saudi Arabia was able to again serve its own geostrategic
interests while accomplishing those of the United States by funding and providing
support for anti-Soviet aggression in Sudan, Zaire, Chad, Yemen, Ethiopia and Somalia.
(Again, see Chalmers Johnson's The Sorrows of Empire and Blowback: The Costs and
Consequences of American Empire.) At the same time, signaling an important future
trend for the Kingdom, the Royal Family funneled money to the PLO (considered a
terrorist organization by the United States), the African Islamic Center in Sudan (which
trained youth in fundamentalist Wahabi interpretations of Islam), and the Faisal Islamic
Bank (freely providing funds to Islamist groups of varying degrees of radicalism).

The Royal Family and The Mobilizing of Faith
The year 1979 would prove to be one of the most important in the history of the
contemporary Near East, particularly for Saudi Arabia. As protests in Iran rapidly
destroyed the political fabric of that nation, fear of a similar fate arose amongst the Royal
Family. The return of exiled Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran came with the risk that Iran
could replace the Kingdom as the most prominent Islamic state; beyond this, the
swiftness with which the religiously fervent Khomeini had replaced a stable monarchy
caused the Royal Family to dread a similar fate. These fears were only strengthened with
the taking of the American embassy in November 1979 and with attempts to spread the
Islamic Revolution outside of Iranian borders. The significant Shi’a population in the east
of Saudi Arabia was targeted with Iranian radio propaganda, playing to views of the
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Royal Family as puppets to American interests: “the ruling regime in Saudi Arabia wears
Muslim clothing, but inwardly represents the U.S. body, mind and terrorism.” (Bronson
2006, 147)
November 20th, 1979 marked one of the most significant episodes in Saudi
domestic history. Believing their mission to be directed by god, preacher Juhayman alUtaybi and hundreds of followers seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca, calling for the
ending of exports to the United States, the expulsion of foreigners from Saudi territory,
“the abolition of radio, television, professional soccer, and employment of women
outside the home… [urging] the downfall of the Royal Family, decrying its corruption
and close relationship with infidel powers.” (Bronson 2006, 147) The crisis ended on
December 4th, but its impact on the Kingdom has never been undone. The Grand Mosque
Seizure, in addition to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, struck the fear of a radical religious
uprising deep into the hearts of the Royal Family. In an attempt to defend against this
very real possibility, Prince Fahd would engage in large scale proselytizing, building the
image (and reality) of Saudi Arabia as the end-all be-all authority on Islamic purism. “So
threatened was the House of Saud by Iran’s religious turn and the domestic critique that it
was not religious enough that the Saudi leadership sought to outbid domestic and
neighboring extremists.” (Bronson 2006, 148)
This appeal to religious spirit would play a key role in Saudi success in its next
foreign entanglement: deflecting Soviet advances in nearby Afghanistan. The December
27th invasion marked another significant threat to the Kingdom, as long-time Soviet
desires for a freshwater port could push the near 100,000 troops south through Iran to the
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Persian Gulf. The responses of both the United States and Saudi Arabia were meek to
begin, supplying propaganda and non-military resources to tribes opposing the invasion.
Shortly thereafter, however, Saudi Arabia urged the United States to take a more
proactive role, agreeing to match fully any capital commitments to the insurgency. A
$100 million covert system of arms transfer was devised, in which the US supplied
Soviet-made arms from around the world to Pakistan as a ‘defensive measure’ against
Soviet border aggression; these arms would find their way into Afghanistan and into the
hands of Saudi-backed mujahideen fighters. Aid was more than quadrupled in 1983 to
$461 million, and by 1985 was taking up more than half of total CIA expenditures.
(Bronson 2006, 171)
While the fighting in Afghanistan was completely unorganized early on, Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan worked together to divide forces into three moderate groups and four
Islamic fundamentalist fighting forces. The most religiously extreme of these forces,
those led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, received the overwhelming
majority of Saudi financing. This was for two reasons: the religious message utilized by
Sayyaf and Hekmatyar was the most effective in rousing mujahideen troops to battle, and
the groups (Sayyaf's in particular) actively spread the message of Saudi Wahabism
amongst native Afghanis. Sayyaf, in fact, had been the founder of the Ittihad-i-Islam
party, a Saudi domestic organization dedicated to spreading militant Islam abroad. This
second aspect of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf's mission was essential to combating the
influence of Iran in Afghanistan, thus maintaining the religious supremacy of Saudi
Arabia. Hekmatyar would later be the target of American forces in Afghanistan post-
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9/11, where he worked with warlords to attack US troops. (Bronson 2006, 173) Sayyaf
would eventually be joined by an eager and highly motivated Osama bin Laden.
While a great deal of funding was committed to the anti-Soviet effort in
Afghanistan by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, “it was largely Arab money
that saved the system.” (Bronson 2006, 174) Within Saudi Arabia (and to a lesser extent
in the Arab world as a whole), countless ‘charitable organizations’ and business groups
were funneling private funding to the most extreme of the mujahideen forces. “Saying, in
particular, had many personal religious or academic contacts in Saudi Arabia, so his
coffers were usually kept well filled. This meant the moderates became proportionately
less efficient…” (Bronson 2006, 174) One group in particular which provided significant
economic support was the World Muslim League, created by Abdel Aziz bin Baz, the
supreme religious leader within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Prince Salman
assisted in recruitment efforts for Sayyaf's forces through mosques and community
organizations espousing an especially militant form of Wahabism. Given the role of state
religion in Saudi Arabia and the direct involvement of a member of the Royal Family, the
line between private charity and state action was crossed. Under Osama bin Laden, these
funds would be used to support the fledgling al-Qaeda.
As the fight escalated, the United States agreed to provide mujahideen forces with
advanced and incredibly destructive technology, most notably Stinger surface-to-air
missiles—weaponry which was outside the grasp of Saudi Arabia itself. This decision,
along with the growing religious intensity of mujahideen fighters, turned the tide of battle
in the favor of the Afghan insurgents and their jihadist peers, and in early 1988 the war
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came to an end with Soviet retreat. This appeared to be a monumental success for the USSaudi-Pakistan coalition, and in the short-term, it certainly was. The United States and
Saudi Arabia had partnered together to defeat the greatest threat posed by the Soviet
menace against the Kingdom, whether that threat was concrete and actual, simply a threat
to Saudi/US hegemony, or merely perceived. In doing so, however, a system of
recruitment and funding was established and left unaccounted for long after Afghanistan
posed any threat to Saudi Arabia. As the Kingdom sought to gain the upper hand on Iran,
its leaders supported the saturation of Saudi society with extreme Wahabi doctrine and
encouraged its youth to continue the spread of Wahabism into Afghanistan. Meanwhile,
mujahideen returning to Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden among them, came to view
Saudi society as devoid of the very religious spirit and conviction they had fought to
develop in Afghanistan. (See: 9/11 Commission Report 2004, 48-70) In the years to
come, Saudi Arabia would reach unprecedented levels of radicalization.
The state of the Saudi economy following the costly mission in Afghanistan,
made only worse by Saudi foreign involvement in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and even
Nicaragua, fueled popular discontent with the Royal Family. A ten dollar drop in perbarrel oil prices left Saudi Arabia unable to maintain its prior level of payment for US
military technology, and the US-Saudi relationship took yet another blow when it was
revealed that the Kingdom had recently purchased nuclear-capable missiles from China.
(Bronson 2006, 188) This ran counter not only to the Saudi commitment to fighting
communism abroad, but challenged the special nature of its relationship with America.
These considerations had little time to weigh on the minds of either party, as Iraqi
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posturing against Kuwait finally came to fruition, and Saddam Hussein invaded his tiny
neighbor on August 2nd, 1990 in response to Kuwait’s alleged overproduction of oil. The
potential for Iraqi advance into Saudi territory was very real, and fortification of Iraqi
troops along Saudi Arabia’s northeast border was enough to convince both President
Bush and King Fahd that a united offensive was necessary.
American officials, led by then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, soon met with
the Royal Family to devise a plan of attack. Essential to the plan was the stationing of
approximately a quarter of a million American troops on Saudi territory. King Fahd
eagerly agreed, believing that such a large force would certainly prevent any Iraqi
attempts at Saudi territory; however, there was considerable disagreement among the rest
of the Royal Family. Crown Prince Abdullah pointed out that all prior decisions dealing
with the stationing of foreign troops on Saudi soil had required approval by the ulema,
but Fahd nonetheless agreed to the American plan. (Bronson 2006, 195) In doing so,
Fahd further increased the tensions between the Saudi religious community and the Royal
Family, yet again placing greater importance on concerns at hand than on potential future
consequences.
While the presence of US forces within Saudi Arabia succeeded in halting any
Iraqi advances into the Kingdom and was essential to undoing the invasion of Kuwait,
around 500,000 American troops would end up in Saudi territory at the height of the
conflict. This substantial presence, unsanctioned by any sort of Saudi religious authority,
only fueled the flames of radicalism born out of the late-1970s and 1980s. The after-thefact issuance of a fatwa by the Grand Mufti, something which would usually be seen as
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legitimizing the decision, in fact only served to factionalize the religious community of
the Kingdom. Instead of quelling radical discontent, this apparent bowing of the highest
religious authority in the land to the Royal Family created an outpour of disapproval from
a number of burgeoning young radical clerics, who used the fatwa to “discredit not only
the Royal Family but the political-religious condominium that forms the basis of the
regime’s legitimacy.” (Bronson 2006, 195)

Different Directions
The end of the first Iraq War left significantly less tying the United States and
Saudi Arabia together. With the Soviet menace and many other perceived major threats to
the Kingdom removed, little commonality of interest remained between the two states; in
its place existed longstanding (and now largely vestigial) weapons deals and the debt of
funding Desert Storm, together almost completely depleting Saudi financial resources.
Widespread anger over these debts incurred on behalf of the United States and the failure
to oust Saddam Hussein from Iraq only served to foster discontent sparked by the
apparent puppeteering of the Kingdom. “There is a massive, socially rooted resentment
against the monarchy and…the sponsor…the United States. And it takes the form of
Islamic fundamentalism as the only ideological channel that is open to these people…”
(Chomsky 2006, 37) Osama bin Laden, who had offered use of his mujahideen fighters in
the Iraq War but was rejected by the Royal Family, was now among the most vocal
critics of both King Fahd and the Saudi religious authority. His growing support was seen

28

as the most significant threat to Saudi stability by the Royal Family, leading to his 1991
exile to Sudan.
Bin Laden’s exile did little to quiet growing opposition, and in fact likely
contributed to the popular belief that the Royal Family and ulema had no interest in
preserving the traditions of Wahabism. A 1991 public declaration by religious authorities
critical of the status quo called for “cleansing the state apparatus of corrupt individuals, a
foreign policy that avoided any alliances that might violate Islamic law, and improving
the country’s institutions of religion and religious dissemination…they argued for the
religious establishment to assume a supervisory role to the government…” (Bronson
2006, 212) This message was strengthened a year later with even greater support,
demanding that the Royal Family “[outlaw] the teaching of Western law, [create] a halfmillion man army aimed at fighting Jews and helping Muslims, and [end] foreign aid to
‘atheistic’ regimes such as Iraq…, Jordan, and Egypt.” (Bronson 2006, 213) The
formation of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights in 1993 (discussed in
some detail later in this essay) acted as an organizational legitimization of anti-House of
Saud sentiment, which continued to grow throughout the 1990s.
In the mid-1990s, this discontent came to a head, in part due to the availability of
uncensored media via the internet and satellite television, resulting in terrorist attacks
against US and Saudi governmental interests within the Kingdom. Domestic crisis
gripped Saudi Arabia, and was only worsened when King Fahd suffered a severe stroke
in 1995, leaving Crown Prince Abdullah as the de facto—though very limited—ruler.
While Abdullah was less willing to blindly serve American interests and certainly more
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cognizant of the growing tensions amongst the population, little could be done to stem
the tide of rebellion. The first major incident of violence came in 1995, when five
Americans were killed in an attack on a Saudi National Guard training institute. A year
later, a truck packed with explosives ignited outside of the Khobar Towers military
housing complex, killing nineteen American soldiers and injuring 372. These incidents
were played down by the Royal Family, who went as far as to welcome twenty thousand
more American troops into the Kingdom when Saddam Hussein again postured
aggressively against Kuwait in 1994. (Bronson 2006, 218) These troop levels rose at a
steep rate into the new millennium.
Eventually, the Royal Family and others within the Saudi government realized the
size of the threat posed by dissidents, and decided to withdraw support for the United
States’ ongoing and unpopular strikes against Iraq, and to disallow the stationing of US
troops within Saudi territory in 2003. (Military to Leave, 2003) The anarchic situation in
Afghanistan further fueled fundamentalism within the Kingdom, as more and more
mujahideen began to return to Saudi Arabia and a handful of Arab states and non-state
actors fought proxy battles for influence within Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden yet again
became a major figure in the fight for Afghanistan, arriving there in 1996 after his exile
to Sudan. Attracting mujahideen remaining from the Soviet-Afghanistan affair and
volunteers dissatisfied with the efforts of established governments and charity groups, bin
Laden was able to turn the failed state of Afghanistan into a terrorist recruitment center,
using aforementioned funding from Abdel Aziz bin Baz and Prince Salman to build up
al-Qaeda Two years after arriving in Afghanistan, he enunciated his purpose in the World
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Islamic Front’s “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” adopting the tone of a fatwa and
calling the killing of Americans and American allies, civilian or military, a “duty” handed
down by Allah. Later that year, the al-Qaeda bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania brought significant attention to bin Laden, killing over 200 (yet only twelve
Americans) and injuring thousands. These attacks exemplified the willingness of alQaeda to engage in acts which, though aimed at Americans, had significant ‘collateral
damage’ affecting local populations.
By the new millennium, US-Saudi relations were so dismal as to be almost
nonexistent. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process was, at that time, the only significant
aspect of American involvement in the Near East, and Saudi Arabia was kept on the
outside looking in on this issue as well. “As Robert A. Malley, the special assistant to the
president for Arab-Israeli affairs at the NSC, recalled, ‘We undervalued how important it
was to get Saudi Arabia on Arafat’s side.’” (Bronson 2006, 230) Beyond this, the growth
of radicalism in Saudi Arabia went unnoticed by the United States. With the al-Aqsa
Intifada—the renewal of Palestinian-Israeli violence in September 2000—anti-Western
sentiment was at its height, especially within the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia, and the Near
East in general, had been reduced to an afterthought in the decade following Desert
Storm. The events of September 11th, 2001 brought the grim reality of this decade of
negligence to the forefront of the American conscience, and again made Saudi Arabia a
central component of American policy toward the Near East, though in a markedly
different manner.
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Entangled in the Web of the Saudi Oil-igarchy
A quarter of the world’s proven oil reserves can be found within the boundaries of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and it is the largest worldwide exporter of petroleum. (US
Congress, Senate 2005) Much of that oil—nineteen percent of crude and three percent of
refined oil—is exported to its largest client, the United States. Today, petroleum is the
lifeblood of American living and the economy of the United States, just as it is for much
of the Western World. Statistically, oil supplies over forty percent of total United States
energy demands, as well as nearly all fuel used in American automobiles. Despite the
United States’ wealth of natural resources, its oil supplies are insignificant, especially in
light of its unrivaled energy needs. “Almost two-thirds of proven world oil reserves are in
the Middle East. In contrast, the United States has less than three percent of the world’s
proven oil reserves.” (US Congress, Senate 2005) Imported petroleum accounts for
nearly sixty percent of American oil needs, and this number has been rising for many
decades. Combined with America’s lack of sufficient domestic oil supply—one which is
likely to decline in the next decades—the United States is forced into dependence on
foreign petroleum. “Today, the United States accounts for about a quarter of total world
oil consumption…forecast of U.S. oil for the next 10–20 years shows trends of flat to
declining domestic supply and increasing oil product demand. This will result in an
increasing dependence on imports.” (US Congress, Senate 2005)
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World production of Crude oil plus NGL (CO+NGL). Color function of the cumulative production in Gb. (Foucher 2006)

In 2006, the United States imported approximately 5,003,082,000 barrels of crude
oil. Of that amount, 2,013,603,000—just over forty percent—came from OPEC
participants, of which the vast majority of members, including Saudi Arabia, are located
in the Middle East. Approximately 534,143,000 barrels per year, or twenty-seven percent
of American imported OPEC petroleum, comes from Saudi Arabia alone. (Energy
Information Administration 2007) On average, the United States imports 1,419,000
barrels of Saudi Arabian crude oil per day. This comes out to eleven percent of total
petroleum imported by the United States, though in the past the percentage has been
significantly higher. (Energy Information Administration 2007) In the end, these figures
make Saudi Arabia the third largest exporter of crude oil to America, behind only Canada
and Mexico, both close neighbors and similarly-minded allies of the United States.
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Another condition that benefits Saudi oil producers and, by extension, American
importers, is that “In addition to having the heaviest concentration of oil reserves in the
world, Middle Eastern producers also have the lowest production costs.” (US Congress,
Senate 2005) Furthermore, ARAMCO earns around one dollar less on barrels exported to
the United States, translating to a subsidy to the United States of $620 million every year.
(Morse 2002)
According to the US State Department, Saudi Arabia’s main foreign policy
objectives are “to maintain its security and its paramount position on the Arabian
Peninsula, defend general Arab and Islamic interests, promote solidarity among Islamic
governments, and maintain cooperative relations with other oil-producing and major oilconsuming countries.” (US State Department Background Note 2007) The United States
aids Saudi Arabia heavily in its attempts to keep its territories safe from attack, most
notably by providing bases, training, funding and weaponry to the King. In the mid1940s, a United States military training facility was established in the Saudi city of
Dhahran, which was eventually used for the training and support of the Saudi armed
forces. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has allowed United States troops to be stationed at the
base, a strategic location given its short distance to Iraq, during American conflicts with
the country in 1990 and for a short time in 2003. In addition to the construction of this
base and supply of combat training, the United States has provided advanced military
technology to the Kingdom at reduced cost, including various military aircraft (F-15
fighter jets, AWACS surveillance systems, Blackhawk helicopters), Patriot and Hawk
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missiles, Bradley infantry vehicles and Abrams tanks, and various other warfare
equipment. (US State Department Background Note 2007)
Arms sales to foreign nations are incredibly lucrative for the American
corporations that supply the weapons, according to the MERIP Middle East Report.
“Selling arms to the Third World is good business for US corporations… Arms sales
abroad make up about five percent of total US export earnings.” (By the Sword 1987, 3)
American funding for the implementation and use of these technologies, as well as
blanket funding for the general defense of Saudi Arabia from 1950 to 2006, totals nearly
$69 billion, according to the US Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
(Foreign Military Sales 2006, 11) These figures make Saudi Arabia the largest grantee of
American defense funding, as well as the largest purchaser of American weaponry and
military technology. The policies which allow these arms trades to continue serve
primarily to empower and perpetuate the American military-industrial complex to the
benefit of a handful of large corporations and to the cost of US taxpayers. All told,
American military funding to Saudi Arabia during the period of 1950 to 2006 was
approximately $40 billion greater than funding to the next two highest-ranking recipients
– Israel and Egypt.

“If ‘totalitarianism’ has any meaning—that’s totalitarianism there”
While this might seem like a symbiotic relationship—Americans receiving oil at
lower prices and access to highly geopolitically important military stations in the center
of a hotbed of American military involvement; Saudi Arabia being given access advanced
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American military technology and know-how to secure its wellbeing and economic
dominance in a region where stability is uncommon—this arrangement comes with a
number of problematic consequences for the United States. The repercussions of this
trade-off range from American economic dependency on foreign petroleum, to the
compromise of stated and implicit American values and political aims, to threats to the
very life and liberty of American citizens both at home and abroad. Separately, each of
these issues poses major difficulties to the United States’ relationship with the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia; taken as a whole, they represent a legitimate and serious threat to the
upholding of American ideals and the security and wellbeing of the nation and its
international interests.
To understand the nature and degree of totalitarianism within the Kingdom, the
sources of the political-religious-legal system present within Saudi Arabia must first be
considered. The entirety of the legal system within the Kingdom is based upon Shari’a
Law. Two texts—the Hikmah and the Shari’a—are the primary sources of Islamic
teachings in general. The Hikmah is primarily a guide for personal relationships and
individual conduct, though it does contain a small amount of instruction on jurisprudence
and social laws. The Shari’a, made up of the Quran, the Sunna, the Fiqh, ijma, and qiyas,
is the cardinal source of Islamic law, and structures all economic, social, and political
interactions. The Quran, transcribed by the inner-circle of the Prophet Mohammad’s
friends and associates, is the primary religious text of the Muslim religion, made up of
divine revelations of the Judeo-Christian-Muslim canon recognized throughout history
combined with guidance on the level of individuals, groups, and governments. The

36

Sunna, though it is widely disagreed upon amongst the various schools of interpretation,
is generally thought of as a code of teachings by Mohammad. This guide serves as the
primary basis for Islamic legal custom, or Shari’a. The rulings of all the prophets of
Islam, collectively known as the Fiqh, are also an integral part of the Shari’a.
Additionally, the ijma (historical consensus of Islamic judges) and qiyas (legal analogy)
make up a portion of the Islamic legal tradition.
The implementation of Shari’a law in Saudi Arabia is pervasive, influencing not
only social customs, but governing all forms of interaction between individuals and
groups, as well as the appropriate sorts of punishments for various crimes. Where the
Shari’a is silent, it is up to judges appointed according to the customs of the Shari’a—
known as ulema within Saudi Arabia—to best discern the finding or punishment
appropriate for a particular transgression. The necessary and sufficient types of evidence
for finding a person guilty of a crime are also contained in the Shari’a, and along with the
means of punishment and sorts of behaviors deemed punishable by legal action, differ
greatly from traditional Western legal codes, and have often been perceived as freedomlimiting, tyrannical, cruel and barbaric by other cultures. The reality of Shari’a law within
Saudi Arabia is that of a self-perpetuating, theocratic and unquestionable regime (the
ulema), embodied with the means and willingness to enforce its decrees with coercion
and violence.
Some recent examples of actions undertaken or otherwise sanctioned by the
ulema serve to exemplify why such controversy has arisen. Perhaps most notorious is the
2007 sentencing of a minority Shi’a female gang-rape victim to six months in prison and
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200 lashes for her violation of the sexual segregation laws of the Shari’a by sharing a
motorcar, prior to her attack, with a man to whom she was not related. The strengthened
punishment came following an attempt by her lawyer—since suspended from legal
practice and subject to disciplinary action—to appeal the case because it was incongruent
with Islamic law. “The judicial bodies should have dealt with this girl as the victim rather
than the culprit,” argued her lawyer. (Rape Sentence Unjust 2007) Seven of the fourteen
perpetrators of the gang rape were sentenced to prison, with terms ranging from less than
a year to around five years—terms which were doubled following the altering of the
victim’s sentence. A Saudi official, when questioned about the treatment of the woman,
stated that the sentence increase was a form of punishment for attempting to question and
aggravate the judiciary through manipulation of the media. (Rape Sentence Unjust 2007)
The US Department of State has refused to condemn the ruling, stating that it is an
expressly Saudi issue and not the business of America. (Shakir 2007)
Women, however, are not the only minorities within Saudi Arabia who have faced
inequality and persecution. While many of the constitutions of Islamic states claim to
protect those living in the country from religious discrimination while also allowing the
use of the Shari’a in the application of law, Saudi Arabia makes no such claim. (AnNi’am 1987) To this end, it prohibits the public practice of any religion other than Islam.
According to the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s International
Religious Freedom Report 2004, “Islam is the official religion [of Saudi Arabia], and the
law requires that all citizens be Muslims… Freedom of religion does not exist.” Political
and economic sanctions are levied against the minority Shi’a population within the
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kingdom, and penalties for non-Muslim public religious practice include “arrest, lashing,
deportation, and torture.” (US State Department Country Report 2004) Additionally,
Muslims in Saudi Arabia are prevented, by penalty of death, from converting to any other
religion. As noted in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, on October 31st,
2004, a male Saudi citizen was arrested and jailed for allegedly converting to
Christianity, and no information on the arrested individual or his trial has been made
public as of yet.
Although private practice of non-Muslim religions is legally allowed in Saudi
Arabia, the Country Report notes that in practice this is often not the case: “During the
year [2004], there were scattered raids, arrests, and detentions of Christians throughout
the country.” The vast majority of these incidents were at the hands of the Mutawwa'in
(the Committee to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice), or Saudi religious police.
Furthermore, state-sponsored hate speech occurs in mosques across Saudi Arabia, with
government-paid religious service leaders using strongly anti-Semitic rhetoric during
public religious gatherings. (US State Department Country Report 2004) Similar
messages have been found throughout the mandatory schoolbooks written or chosen
specifically by the Saudi government. The message that “Jews were banned from
entering the country” was posted on the official tourism website of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, though it was removed on March 1st, 2004 following international pressure. (US
State Department Country Report 2004)
In courtroom proceedings, non-Muslims also fare much worse than their Islamic
counterparts. Saudi interpretation of Shari’a law allows judges to completely discount the
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testimony of any individuals who are not practicing Muslims, thus putting non-Muslims
who come to the defense of fellow non-Muslims at a strong disadvantage. Clearly, this
hinders severely any hopes for justice in cases with non-Muslim defendants.
Additionally, because the vast majority of courtroom procedures in Saudi Arabia are
closed from the public, little of what goes on in legal proceedings is accurately known.
All of this discrimination before the law is further enabled by the mandatory carrying of
identification cards which identify the holder as either ‘Muslim’ or ‘Non-Muslim.’ It
goes without saying that non-Muslims are prevented from holding any sort of political or
governmental office in Saudi Arabia, thus rendering the prospects for consideration of the
interests of non-Muslims within the Kingdom quite grim.
On the international level, Saudi Arabia has been completely unwilling to accept
any form of international human rights law, viewing such agreements as challenges to the
supremacy of the teachings of Islam. An original member of the United Nations, Saudi
Arabia was among those few UN member nations to abstain on the vote to adopt the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The question of human rights scantly
existed in Saudi Arabia before the 1970s, when a series of meetings was held between
government officials and high-ranking religious authorities to address the issue. The
result of these meetings was a reiteration of the primacy of Shari’a in determining the
laws and mores of proper Islamic nations. (Koraytem 2001) It was not until 1981 that
Saudi Arabia made any sort of official statement on human rights when it accepted the
terms of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights (commonly known as the Human Rights
Declaration in Islam).
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The Human Rights Declaration in Islam states that those living in Islamic states
have “freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the Islamic Shari’a” and
that “all men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and
responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of race, colour, language, belief,
sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other considerations.” (Cairo
Declaration 1990) Obviously, both of these premises have been ignored or outright
flouted within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. What has certainly been taken to heart by
the Saudi government from the Cairo Declaration is the reiteration of the unquestionable
status of Shari’a code as paramount in all matters, particularly the sanctity of life,
punishment for crimes, and the prohibition of citizens to exert “any form of pressure on a
man to force him to change his religion to another religion or to atheism.” (Cairo
Declaration 1990)
While the declaration states that “no restrictions stemming from race, color or
nationality shall prevent [individuals] from exercising [the right of marriage],” a
prescriptive doctrine regarding marriage between members of different religions is
notably unaccounted for. As such, Saudi Arabia has restricted women from the ability to
engage in marriage with non-Muslims and non-citizens, though Muslim men can initiate
marriages with Christians and Jews. (US State Department Country Report 2004) The
Cairo Declaration also states that “woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has her
own rights to enjoy…and…her own civil entity,” though this statement is obviously in
need of qualification ad infinitum for the Saudi concept of women’s dignity to be
rectified with that of the Cairo Declaration. Furthermore, the statement that “all
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individuals are equal before the law, without distinction between the ruler and the ruled”
is included in the declaration, though, as previously noted, the testimony of non-Muslims
can be thrown out or otherwise discounted by Saudi judges. Plainly, there is a great deal
of deviation from even those tenets of the Human Rights Declaration in Islam agreed to
by the Saudi government. The entire document, in its application by Saudi Arabia, is best
summed up by its penultimate clause: “All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this
Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'a.”
Since the 1981 acceptance of the Cairo Declaration, there has been pressure from
intellectuals within Saudi Arabia and analysts internationally for a proper enumeration of
rights, specifically for women and religious minorities. One notable instance in February
of 1991 involved the publishing of a letter to King Fahd signed by 43 prominent
businessmen and intellectuals which petitioned for the formation of governmental
councils to diminish corruption amongst the Mutawwa'in. This pressure, headed up by
international businessmen vital to Saudi monetary interests, persuaded King Fahd to
decree the “Basic Law” of Saudi Arabia. This Basic Law, similar somewhat to a
constitution, outlined the creation of the Majlis, a legislative body made up of sixty
members, all of which are appointed by the king. Unsurprisingly, the members of this
legislature primarily represent the views of the Saudi ruling family, though some
‘Westernized’ individuals whose anti-extremist ideologies are not a threat to the
administration have been appointed to calm the flow of social unrest throughout the
kingdom. (Gresh 1995, 4)
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The question of whether this establishment of a semi-formal constitution
represents any sort of progress for non-Muslims in Saudi Arabia is dubious at best, as the
opening chapters of the Basic Law again reiterate the primacy of Shari’a in determining
the law of the land, and the absolute power of the monarchy. Article 26 states that “The
State shall protect human rights in accordance with Islamic Shari’a,” though this is an
extremely vague iteration of a human rights guarantee, and the legal rights of nonMuslims and foreigners in the kingdom are conspicuously absent throughout the entire
Basic Law. Gilbert Achcar quite succinctly sums up the status of political freedoms in
Saudi Arabia to this day: “If ‘totalitarianism’ has any meaning, that’s totalitarianism
there. Any attempt at organizing anything challenging the powers that be is repressed in
the most terrible way.” (Chomsky 2006, 38)

The Consequences of Maintaining US-Saudi Hegemony
The bartering of oil for security between Saudi Arabia and the United States has
led to negative ideological consequences in that such activity compromises what are
considered to be core American values, as well as the stated agendas of a number of
Presidents and other important policymakers. As the preceding pages illustrate, Saudi
Arabia has a long history of human rights abuses, and is among the least democratic of all
industrialized nations. The questionable status of human rights in the Kingdom is one that
is publicly and forthrightly acknowledged by the US government in a number of
documents (see: 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007 Background
Note – Saudi Arabia), as well as legislative and presidential discourses and public
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statements throughout recent decades. In general, the Department of State has expressed
concern about “abuse of prisoners and incommunicado detention; prohibitions or severe
restrictions on the freedoms of speech, press, peaceful assembly and association, and
religion; denial of the right of citizens to change their government; systematic
discrimination against women and ethnic and religious minorities; and suppression of
workers' rights.” (US State Department Background Note 2007)
Support for governments which contain or condone these characteristics or fail to
actively pursue their cessation is directly in opposition to the stated goals of nearly every
United States president since diplomatic ties were extended to Saudi Arabia in 1933. This
is most notably the explicit attitude of former president George W. Bush, as outlined in
his National Security Strategy of the United States of America following 9/11: “America
must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits
on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect
for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.” (Bush 2002,
3) Additionally, the first official Bush administration address on reform in Middle East
nations decrees that the United States aims “to help…countries become more stable,
more prosperous, more peaceful, and more adaptable…[and to] be more actively engaged
in supporting democratic trends in the Muslim world than ever before.” (Haass 2003)
Such blatant hypocrisy not only casts doubt on the earnestness of the rhetoric of the
American government, but compromises the legitimacy of US aims internationally,
weakening so-called 'soft power' essential to international relations.
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In Perilous Power, Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Achcar attempt to trace back the
contemporary phenomenon of Islamist non-state terrorism, and ultimately arrive at the
conclusion that much of the modern hatred of the West amongst such groups is the result
of US interference in the establishment of secular nationalism. In particular, support for
Islamic fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia as a counterweight to the spread of communism
and intrastate nationalist movements (principally via the mujahideen in Afghanistan) is
cited as the main source of bitterness among the Arab world toward the United States.
Why would the US squash the rise of democracy within the Near East? Achcar posits that
“if you implement democracy there, the ‘bad guys’ would win...in some countries,
democracy leads to the victory of forces hostile to the West.” (Chomsky 2006, 42)
Chomsky echoes Achcar’s sentiment, stating that the forces of power within the United
States “support democracy if and only if it conforms to U.S. economic and strategic
objectives.” (Chomsky 2006, 43) The parliamentary elections of Egypt in 2005 (which
came about at the behest of the United States) are cited as a prime example of this:
“Mubarak…saw to it that the Muslim Brotherhood—a fundamentalist group—emerged
clearly as the major power to gain from this carefully controlled opening… His
message…was: If you push for democracy, you’ll get these guys in power. So, leave me
alone!” (Chomsky 2006, 45-6)
While ideology is without question the chief fuel for radical anti-Western
terrorism throughout the Near East and elsewhere, conflict on such a scale simply cannot
occur without massive amounts of expendable capital amongst terrorist groups. Analysis
of the allocation of American grants to Saudi Arabia shows that some of the funding was
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being funneled into terrorist organizations which were responsible for attacks on
Americans at home and abroad: “Intense financial scrutiny also revealed a disturbing
pattern of Saudi capital underwriting schools and mosques throughout the region…that
inculcated hate and intolerance and provided foot soldiers to al-Qaeda” (Bronson 2006,
236) A study on the sources of terrorism financing following the 9/11 terrorist attacks
found that a number of charities and wealthy oil industry individuals in Saudi Arabia
were large sources of funding for al-Qaeda operations. (Bronson 2006, 237)
A tense diplomatic situation resulted from these discoveries, with the Saudi
government eventually making concessions to the United States in the way of
intensifying counterterrorism efforts, closing down the official charity of the Saudi Royal
Family, and working closely with American official Fran Townsend and Saudi
counterterrorism expert Muhammad bin Naif to oversee counterterrorism operations in
the Kingdom. (Bronson 2006, 243–44) “We have…worked with the Saudis to clarify the
flow of funds and to rectify past inefficiencies that made it possible for funds to flow
relatively easily to terrorist sources.” (US Congress, Senate 2005) While these measures
show some progress, many feel these steps are insufficient, and former State Department
official and UN al-Qaeda monitoring group member Victor Comras points to the fact that
millionaire terror financier Yassin Qadi “continues to direct his international business
empire from Switzerland and Saudi Arabia” and notes that while many organizations
funding terrorism have had their operations halted within Saudi Arabia, they continue to
operate outside of its borders without any Saudi attempt to end their operations. (Comras
2005) Dr. Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security,
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summarized America’s resultant position best: “[W]e are locked in an odd situation in
which we are fighting a war on terrorism and we are paying for both sides of the war.”
(US Congress, Senate 2005)

Our Perilous Future
A number of improvements to the US-Saudi relationship have occurred in the
nine years since the 9/11 attacks. Initial relations were icy, with the Royal Family
unwilling to own up to the fact that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi citizens,
publicly stating that the attacks were likely the result of Zionism. Moreover, the Royal
Family and other high-ranking religious and political officials ardently denied supporting
terrorism despite the findings of American financial analysts to the contrary. However,
the attacks and resultant environment have allowed the United States to reengage with
Saudi Arabia and cooperate on issues relevant to the security and economic interests of
both nations. Eight years after the attacks, the two nations are able to deal with each other
in a much more frank manner, the realities of Saudi terrorist funding and American
indifference to the rise of Islamic extremism laid bare for all to see by the 9/11
Commission and other literature on the subject. (9/11 Commission Report 2004)
In particular, recognition within the United States that a strong focus on reform is
an essential component of any continued US-Saudi relationship is a significant step in the
right direction. Extremism in Saudi Arabia is and was largely the result of government
nurturing of religious interests over those of pragmatists as a means to guarantee the
perpetuation of the Royal Family’s power and the larger success of Wahabism and
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puritanical Islam abroad. Clearly, this plan has backfired in a major way in terms of the
first goal, culminating in a series of domestic terrorist attacks beginning in 2003 which
have targeted the Royal Family, the Saudi National Guard, moderate religious
institutions, and the Saudi oil infrastructure. As a result, the Royal Family has been
significantly more willing to ‘play ball’ when it comes to counter-terrorism efforts, and
the United States has had some leeway in pushing for domestic reform toward that end.
In particular, the US has pushed for, and in many cases received, liberalization
within the education system, the Saudi religious establishment, and terrorist funding
schemes. Schoolbooks with anti-American and anti-Semitic messages, formerly
handpicked by the Royal Family, have been replaced with more neutral choices. While
these reforms have been mild, they represent a willingness on behalf of the Royal Family
to compromise unrelenting sovereignty in regard to domestic issues as a means to secure
stability which will allow them to remain in power.
Before the question of how the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia
ought to be altered can even be considered, it is necessary first to address whether there is
willingness on the part of American policymakers to undertake that challenge. I wrote to
Dr. Chomsky regarding this particular issue, and his response spelled a bleak future for
those fighting for greater freedoms within Saudi Arabia, at least as far as the help of the
United States is concerned. He characterized the discussion as “a hypothetical situation
which is very remote from current reality…,” stating that “if the US were interested in
reform in SA—it isn't—there are some things it could do, but not very much... Honesty
[about political aims] would eliminate a weapon that has been deployed with grim
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consequences.” This forecast is in line with much of what Dr. Chomsky posits about the
relationship between the US and the Near East in general—the constant “playing off” of
one state against another as a means to prevent any sort of nationalist or unified religious
source of power in the region, thus allowing US domination of economic and geopolitical
interests.
If the United States were to attempt to push for reform in Saudi Arabia through
traditional methods, it would face a substantially more difficult battle than it would
against most other states. This challenge stems from the amount of power Saudi Arabia
wields within the global economy due to its position as the largest oil exporter within
OPEC. For the United States to attempt a trade embargo or something along those lines
would be wholly ineffective, as East Asia alone accounts for around 50% of Saudi oil
exports and that region and others could certainly accept more substantial petroleum
shipments. (Energy Information Administration—Saudi Arabia) As such, any attempt at
embargo or other traditional means of economic pressure would require multilateral
cooperation—quite unlikely given European willingness to deal with the Kingdom and
the occasional instability of Russian oil flow. Furthermore, the high level of entanglement
between the US industrial-military complex and Saudi defense spending renders any such
attempt almost nonsensical.
Not all views of the future of US-Saudi relations are so grim, however. Shari'a
scholar Abdullahi An-Na’im believes that religious reformation within the Kingdom is
the key to improving the liberty of those living under the Shari’a. Of course, the realworld implementation of Shari’a law is impacted not only by the religious texts upon
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which it had its original basis, but the sociological and historical development of the law
in various Muslim nations. In this case, the experience of Islam must be stressed as an
important contributing factor to the development of Shari’a Law. As Abdullahi An-Na’im
points out in his consideration of religious minorities under the Shari’a, “The experience
of the Muslims, like that of any other people, was shaped by the operative economic,
social, and political forces at any given point of Muslim history. These same forces,
however, were influenced by, and in turn influenced, Muslim religious law, the Shari’a.”
(An-Na’im 1987) Such analysis shows that the Quran, written in two distinct periods
(610 to 622 and 622 to 632), shows great differences in content and demeanor congruent
with the ongoing changes in Muslim society at the time, reflecting the needs of
Mohammad in establishing Medina as an Islamic state. An-Na’im takes this argument
further, stating that “Shari'a is in fact no more than the understanding of the early
Muslims of the sources of Islam. That understanding, as will be shown below, must have
been, and was in fact, influenced by the early Muslims' experience and perception of their
world.” (An-Na’im 1987) Summarily, An-Na’im contends that “the Shari'a…was
developed by Muslim jurists in the second and third century of Islam…[the] raw material
out of which Shari'a was constructed was not, therefore, the pure Qur'an and Sunnah.”
(An-Na’im, 1987)
Where the Shari’a is silent, it is up to judges appointed according to the customs
of the Shari’a to best discern the finding or punishment appropriate for a particular
transgression. From this practice comes much of the behavior deemed 'inhumane' and
'abusive' by opponents of the system. Given the unwillingness of the Royal Family to
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give under either international or domestic pressure to reconsider the strictness of Shari'a
as it has been understood thus far, it may seem quite unlikely that change in this arena
will come about any time in the near future. The post-9/11 socio-political landscape
within Saudi Arabia, however, is seeming more and more like a fertile environment for
reform to take root. The drastically altered domestic security environment within the
Kingdom has forced the Royal Family to come to terms with the reality of extremist
threats to its rule.
This state of affairs leaves the Royal Family with two options:

escalating

limitations on freedom of association and public expression, or limited liberalization.
Given that most of the criticism and action against the Royal Family occurs anonymously
or outside of the public realm, the former avenue presents no real likelihood of lessening
the impact of extremist groups, and will more likely be viewed as an attempt by the
Royal Family to thwart questioning of its legitimacy, thus increasing unrest within the
Kingdom. Recent events within Saudi Arabia seem to hint that King Abdullah is
embarking on a mission of reform in his waning years of rule.
Serving as an example of the movement toward moderation is the meeting of
King Abdullah with reform petitioners in 2003. The petition called for "a constitutional
system of government with an elected legislature, an empowered and separate judiciary
and an acknowledgment...of a variety of different rights—free speech, freedom to form
associations as well as a commitment to address an expanded role for women in Saudi
society." (Russell 2003) The petitioners stated that the Royal Family must "admit that
being late in adopting radical reforms and ignoring popular participation in decision-
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making have been the main reasons that helped the fact that our country reached this
dangerous turn," and stressed that such a state of affairs left Saudi Arabia "unable to
dialogue with others because of its inherent structure" and did not "reflect the greatness
of Islam nor [its] enlightened trends, which is what helped create the terrorist and
judgmental mind that our country is still plagued with." (Russell 2003) The willingness
of the King to meet with rights petitioners in the midst of an internal security crisis shows
hope for a future commitment to reform and recognition that continued clampdowns on
citizen involvement in the political process will only create more unrest.
Of course, the measures of reform called for within the petition cannot simply be
decreed by the King. To achieve reform in any meaningful sense, King Abdullah will
have to contend with three principal forces: the rest of the Royal Family, the Saudi
religious establishment, and his citizenry. Prospects for dealing with the Royal Family are
mixed, though they have certainly improved since Abdullah's proper ascent to the throne
in 2005. Some within the Royal Family, such as Minister of the Interior Prince Naif, are
strongly opposed to substantial reform; others, including Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal,
view progress as “inevitable” and believe that “the ruling family should try to preserve its
position by managing and controlling the reform process.” (Russell 2003) Nevertheless,
an underlying consideration within all inter-Royal Family affairs is the process of
succession to the throne, and some in close position to become King might not support
reform as it would likely lessen their ability to wield power.
The fiercest opposition to reform is without question the Saudi religious
establishment (the Nejd). Given the importance of religion within the Kingdom, the Nejd,
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which controls activities within all mosques and schools, is incredibly powerful.
Furthermore, the Nejd plays a large institutional role in Saudi politics, as it is solely
entrusted with all legal questions. Especially with the increasing influence of radical
young clerics over the past few decades, the Nejd has grown increasingly disconnected
from the Royal Family in its ideology and aims. Reform, especially the possibility of a
formal Saudi constitution, would almost certainly limit the role of the Nejd in education
and the legal world, thus lessening its power and influence within the Kingdom. (Russell
2003) Any attempt at reform must be incredibly careful in dealing with this important
element of Saudi society; to trample on its power and go forward without considerable
Nejd involvement would surely lead to considerable backlash, not only from radicals like
Sheikh Safr al-Hawali, but moderates as well.
The final major roadblock to reform within the Kingdom is the people of Saudi
Arabia. Largely uninvolved in Saudi politics, it remains to be seen exactly what a
liberalized Kingdom which considers the wishes and desires of its citizens would look
like. While prior episodes of public engagement with the Saudi government have largely
been negative, it may very well be that those taking part in such protests represent a vocal
radical minority, with most of Saudi society significantly more moderate in its views.
This unknown factor also plays a role in the extent to which the United States (and
others) should push for reform. While a democratic Saudi Arabia (if it ever will exist) is
certainly a long way off, it could pose a greater threat to both domestic and international
peace than the current system and resultant political climate. The acerbic ideals and
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declarations of radical clerics may, in fact, be an indicator of larger public sentiment
rather than representing the most extreme and loudest segments of Saudi society.
Nevertheless, such a concern should not figure largely in the US choice to
actively support reform within Saudi Arabia. Although American policymakers have alltoo-often ignored the long-term repercussions of their choices, the potential that citizens
would ever have enough power within the Saudi system to substantially affect the
internal or international security of the Kingdom is almost nonexistent. Beyond this, there
is little likelihood that a significant portion of Saudis identify with the likes of Hawali, or
that if they do, such ideology would be actuated within a democratized Saudi Arabia.
What is a more likely result of reform and liberalization is a decline of radicalism within
the Kingdom. Giving the people of Saudi Arabia a say in the actions of its government
will lend some sense of popular legitimacy to the Royal Family and its choices. With
popular backing of or at least involvement in the decisions of the Saudi government,
radicals may be less willing to engage in terrorism aimed at the 'puppet regime' of the
Kingdom.
Given the realization of the Royal Family's prior claims of reform, any hope for
the emergence of a noticeably different Saudi Arabia should be quite guarded. The status
of women within Saudi Arabia remains deplorable, those who publicly criticize the
government are still sometimes jailed, and freedom of the press is extremely limited. This
is not to say that King Abdullah has made no reforms within the Kingdom, nor that he
will fail to bring about more. In terms of his willingness to work with the United States,
former CIA director Michael Hayden was "struck, maybe even surprised…by the degree
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of emotion in [King Abdullah]'s voice when he is talking about Al Qaeda and how unIslamic Al Qaeda really is." (Dickey 2009) In terms of civil liberties, speech is freer than
ever (though still monitored and limited in some unacceptable manners), and Abdullah
has allowed women within his government—particularly Princess Adelah, a “public
face” of the Royal Family—to play a larger role than ever before. (Dickey 2009) One
diplomat working closely with the King earnestly believes that Abdullah would like to
bring Saudi Arabia much further along in its liberalization, stating, "The king's heart is in
the right place, but he's up against an intransigent bureaucracy." (Dickey 2009)
Although there is risk that the United States' efforts to support reform within the
Kingdom will amount to nothing, the US ought to focus more on the positive changes
being undertaken by King Abdullah and not the history of oppression and restriction
within the Kingdom which continues in many forms today. Reform in Saudi Arabia will
be incremental and slow, perhaps even glacial in its pace. This, however, should not be
accepted as an excuse by American foreign policymakers for a complete lack of change
within the Kingdom. Under the direction of President Obama, who is quite popular in the
Muslim world, there can be greater hope for productive US involvement with the Near
East in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. The Israeli-Palestinian situation remains
one of the most important international considerations within the Kingdom, and Obama
has promised a more substantial US role in peacekeeping and negotiations, which will
surely go far in pleasing the Royal Family and citizenry of Saudi Arabia. Obama has
gone as far as publicly expressing support for the Arab Plan for Peace in Palestine put
forth by King Abdullah in 2002. (BBC Obama Mid-East Agenda 2009)
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In his June 2009 speech at Cairo University, President Obama stated his
commitment to reform in the Near East, noting that “Many Gulf States have enjoyed
great wealth as a consequence of oil.... [but] in too many Muslim communities there
remains underinvestment in [education and innovation]. I am emphasizing such
investments within my country. And while America in the past has focused on oil and gas
in this part of the world, we now seek a broader engagement.” (Obama Egypt Speech
2009) Specific measures to support education and communication include the
development of exchange and overseas internship programs, and expanded availability of
telecommunications technologies in the Near East. An entrepreneurship summit and
expansion of US-Near East business partnerships were also outlined by Obama as means
to provide greater commonality between Americans and the Near East. It is through these
united efforts for tangible progress, in addition to cooperation on political and
institutional reform with foreign heads of state such as King Abdullah, that the ties
binding the United States and Saudi Arabia will hopefully be repaired and strengthened—
a goal which, if realized, will surely go far in improving the historically tumultuous
relations of the United States and the Near East.
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